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IT IS NOT WHETHER YOU WIN OR LOSE, IT is How You
PLAY THE GAME: IS THE WiN-Loss SCOREKEEPING
MENTALITY DOING JUSTICE FOR PROSECUTORS?
Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert"
My job is to play a game. I have a rule book to guide me but its terms
are vague. Scholars debate what the terms mean but are unable to come to a
resolution. Thus, I define the terms myself in the same manner as other play-
ers who are in different positions on different teams. At the very least, the
terms mean that I must win because no one would pay me to lose. I have
played the game before and am undefeated, with an impressive record of 50-
0. With such an impressive record, I can advance to more intense games-
especially if myfans realize what a winner I am. I have enormous power be-
hind me to help me win. I can choose or dismiss ny opponents, buy the help
of others, and use my virtually unchecked power against my opponents. Even
if I do not play the game well, and I lie, cheat, and dishonor the game it-
self-1 will face no consequences. When I play the game unfairly, and even
hurt innocent people in the process, others will label my actions as "harm-
less. " There is no recourse for my misconduct in my attempt to win the
game. I thus continue my pursuit of wins, but I an supposed to be "just. " I
have a blindfold on, but if I take it off I can see the procedure I need to fol-
low to be "just. " Who am I? I am ... a prosecutor.*
As Clarence Darrow, a famous twentieth century lawyer, said:
[L]awyers are supposed to want justice, but in reality there is no such
thing as justice, either in or out of court. In fact, the word cannot be de-
fined. So, for lack of proof, let us assume that the word "justice" has a
meaning, and that the common idea of the definition is correct, without
even seeking to find out what is the common meaning. Then how do we
reach justice through the courts? The lawyer's idea of justice is a verdict
for his client, and really this is the sole end for which he aims.'
J.D. Candidate 2002, California Western School of Law; B.S. Paralegal. Winona State
University; A.S. Law Enforcement, Rochester Community College. The author has experi-
ence as a volunteer and a paid legal intern at a prosecutor's office, and she has accepted a
prosecutor position pending successful completion of the bar examination in 2002. The author
wishes to commend all good prosecutors who pay less attention to their "score" and instead
focus on justice--procedurally and substantively. The author wishes to thank her best friend
and husband Lawrence P. Gilbert and her son Steven Nieken for their support.
.. This is a hypothetical for illustrative purposes only and is not about the author.
1. CLARENCE DARRow, VERDICTS OUT OF COURT 316 (Arthur & Lala Weinberg eds.,
Elephant Paperbacks 1989) (1963).
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Prosecutors' idea of justice is a guilty verdict for the people of the city,
county, state, or territory the prosecutor represents. The prosecutor aims for
the sole end of achieving convictions against each defendant. This article
discusses how the win-loss record-keeping mentality of prosecutors does lit-
tle justice. Part I begins by defining a prosecutor's role in our legal system.
Part II documents the tally-keeping mentality of prosecutors. Part III exam-
ines the motivations prosecutors have for keeping and maintaining a good
"score." Part IV reveals various instances of prosecutor misconduct that re-
sult from the win-loss scorekeeping mentality that pushes prosecutors to in-
crease convictions. Part V demonstrates how there are little consequences for
prosecutorial misconduct stemming from the win-loss scorekeeping mental-
ity, perpetuating the pattern of misconduct. Lastly, Part VI examines an al-
ternative means to measure the success of prosecutors in lieu of the win-loss
tallying.
I. THE PROSECUTOR'S ROLE
The prosecutor's role in our legal system is defined by various ethical
rules and precedent-setting cases. This role is distinct from the role of pri-
vate attorneys or defense attorneys and possesses an enormous amount of
power in our legal system. Unfortunately, the prosecutor's enormously pow-
erful role is ill-defined in vague hortatory language, leading one to question
exactly what the prosecutor's role really is.
A. Ethical Rules that Define the Prosecutor's Role
The prosecutor's role is described by the American Bar Association as
"an administrator of justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court."2 As a
"minister of justice and not simply . . . an advocate,' the prosecutor must
"seek justice, not merely to convict."' The prosecutor has a dual role to be
both an adversary and to also accomplish "impartial justice."5 This role has
sometimes been described as a quasi-judicial one.6 Although the prosecutor
functions as an adversary, the prosecutor is obliged "to protect the innocent
as well as to convict the guilty, to guard the rights of the accused as well as
2. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSIi
FUNCTION 3-1.2 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
3. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1994); ABA STANDARDS, Sttpra
note 2, 3-1.2, crnt..; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, 3-3.11 cmt.
4. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, 3-1.2. See also ABA Opinion 150 (1936), cited in
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 n.24 (1969), "The prosecuting attorney is
the attorney for the state, and it is his primary duty not to convict but to see that justice is
done." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1969); MODEL CODE OF PRO'I.
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981).
5. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218
(1958), cited in MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 n.24 (1969).
6. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, 3-1.2 cmt.
JVol. 38
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to enforce the rights of the public."7 The prosecutor must "strive not for
'courtroom victories'. . . but for results that best serve the overall interests of
justice."8 The standards of private or defense attorneys cannot be the prose-
cutor's guide if the duty to seek justice is to be properly fulfilled.' The
prosecutor has a duty to "seek to reform and improve the administration of
criminal justice."'" The prosecutor also has a duty to take action to correct
substantive or procedural inadequacies or injustices." The prosecutor's duty
to make sure the process is fair even extends into sentencing." The prosecu-
tor must disclose exculpatory evidence, unless the prosecutor seeks a protec-
tive order on the basis that such evidence could result in substantial harm to
a particular individual or to the public.'3
During the process from indictment to sentencing of a defendant, the
prosecutor's role obliges him or her-voluntarily and without request-to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense counsel" and even to continue
seeking evidence that may be potentially damaging to the prosecutor's
case. 5 Further, the prosecutor must not present the court with false testimony
or exhibits. 6 Upon discovering that a witness has committed perjury or an
exhibit bears false testimony, the prosecutor has a duty to request the with-
drawal of such evidence from the record.'7 The prosecutor must also beware
not to overstep the bounds of permissible argument in closing arguments
given to the jury."
Perhaps one of the most important ethical guidelines defining a prosecu-
tor's role is found in the discussion of conflicts of interest. "A prosecutor
should not permit his or her own professional judgment or obligations to be
affected by his or her own political, financial, business, property, or personal
interests." 9 A prosecutor definitely has an interest in his or her own career
success and advancement, which can sometimes be a conflict of interest."
The prosecutor must avoid measuring success "by the 'conviction rate' of
the office!"' or by the prosecutor's own conviction rate. Decisions by the
prosecutor to bring, dismiss, or reduce charges should not be influenced by
7. Id
8. Id 3-1.3, cmt.
9. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, supra note 5; MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RusPONSIBn-rry EC 7-13 (198 1).
10. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2,3-1.2.
11. Id.
12. Id 3-6.1, cmt.
13. Id 3-6.2, cmt.
14. Id 3-3.11, 3-3.11 Cmt; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (1995).
15. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, 3-3.11.
16. Id 3-5.6.
17. Id
18. Id 3-5.8, cmt.
19. Id 3-1.3.
20. See id 3-1.3, cmt.
21. Id 3-3.9, cmt.
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the prosecutor's desire to inflate the success rate of the office" or his or her
own success rate.
A prosecutor also has a general duty not to abuse the power of the of-
fice,23 nor engage in conduct that would be prejudicial to the administration
of justice.' Furthermore, the prosecutor must not engage in conduct that in-
volves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 5 Ultimately, the
prosecutor's role is defined in the ethical codes as an administrator of justice
by ensuring a substantively and procedurally fair environment for the crimi-
nal defendant.
B. Precedent-Setting Cases Defining A Prosecutor's Role
Precedent-setting cases also define the role of a prosecutor. In Berger v.
United States, the Supreme Court defined the prosecutor's role as a:
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sover-
eignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obli-
gation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prose-
cution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such,
he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-
fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is
as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
just one."6
The Supreme Court has specifically declared that one of the prosecu-
tor's duties is to provide the defense counsel with material evidence." In
Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court said, "the suppression by the prose-
cution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
22. Id. 3-3.9, cmt.
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4, cmt. 4 (1995).
24. Id. R. 8.4.
25. Id.
26. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). The court reversed and ordered a new trial due to prosecutor
misconduct. Id. at 89. The prosecutor
overstepped the bounds of that propriety and fairness which should characterize
the conduct of such an officer in the prosecution of a criminal offense.... Fie was
guilty of misstating the facts in his cross-examination of witnesses; of putting into
the mouths of such witnesses things which they had not said; of suggesting by his
questions that statements had been made to him personally out of court, of which
no proof was offered; of pretending to understand that a witness had said some-
thing which he had not said and persistently cross-examining the witness upon that
basis; of assuming prejudicial facts not in evidence; of bullying and arguing with
witnesses; and, in general, of conducting himself in a thoroughly indecorous and
improper manner.
1d. at 84.
27. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
286 [Vol. 38
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where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."2' The Supreme Court has
defined the prosecutor's role as one of seeking justice, yet operating as an
adversary.
C. The Prosecutor's Role is Distinct From the Role of Private or Defense
Attorneys
In our "modified adversarial system,"' the prosecutor's role is to seek
justice while the defense attorney's role is "to prevent, by all lawful and
ethical means, the 'whole truth' from coming out. [The defense attorney] is
not concerned about 'justice' for the general public or about the rights of
victims. He is supposed to try to get his guilty client the best deal possible,
preferably an acquittal."' Whereas prosecutors have a duty to disclose ex-
culpatory evidence and evidence that would impeach the prosecutor's own
witnesses, defense attorneys have no such obligation." Furthermore, while a
defense attorney can cross-examine a prosecution witness to attack the wit-
ness' credibility for telling the truth when the defense attorney knows the
witness is truthful, the prosecution cannot engage in the same type of con-
duct.32
Although prosecutors are not supposed to take the defense attorney or
private attorney's behavior as a guide,33 prosecutors begin to rationalize that
if their adversaries can do it, so can they. ' Prosecutors further rationalize
that certain evidence may not really be exculpatory or impeaching evi-
dence. 5 They also rationalize that they would not "deliberately suborn per-
jury" if they knew for certain that the witness was lying.' The result of these
rationalizations is that prosecutors take on the same role as attorneys in the
private sector, while getting further away from their ethical obligation to be
"administrators of justice."
D. The Prosecutor Has Enormous Power
The prosecutor possesses an enormous amount of power that further de-
fines the prosecutor's role.37 The prosecutor has the power to convene a
28. Id.
29. Alan M. Dershowitz, Foreward to the First Edition of JosEvit F. LAwLss. JR.,
PROSECUITORIAL MISCONDUCT xiv (2d ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 1999) (1985).
30. Id at xiv-xv. The defense attorney has no duty to seek justice. JosEti F. LAwLEss,
JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 23 (2d ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 1999) (1985).
31. Dershowitz, supra note 30, at xiv.
32. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAwYERs' Emics 214 (1990).
33. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference. supra note 5.
34. Dershowitz, supra note 29, at xiii.
35. Id. at xiv.
36. Id. at xiii.
37. "The power and significance of the prosecutor is derived from the main roles that he
5
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grand jury, issue warrants for arrest, grant immunity in exchange for favor-
able testimony, initiate criminal proceedings, and dismiss charges. 8 These
are powers obviously unavailable to the defense. 9 The power of the prosecu-
tor "to damage or destroy anyone he chooses to indict is virtually limit-
less."' Justice Robert H. Jackson said this power was one of the most dan-
gerous powers a prosecutor has because "he will pick the people he should
get, rather than cases that need to be prosecuted."4 Justice Jackson argued
that this immense power demanded that prosecutors play fair and decent
with a "dispassionate, reasonable and just" attitude." Again, the role of the
prosecutor as an administrator of justice is apparent, but what does that
mean?
E. Substantive Justice is Difficult to Define
Clarence Darrow said, "U]ustice is something that man knows little
about."'" Darrow said justice cannot be defined" and can never "be a lofty
ideal. It has no emotions or passions. It has no wings. Its highest flight is to
the Blind Goddess that stands on the courthouse roof. It savors syllogisms
and fine distinctions which have no meaning or value in the important mat-
ters in life."'" Even Plato could not define the concept of "justice":
If I thought it possible to deal adequately with the subject in a treatise or a
lecture for the general public, what finer achievement would there have
been in my life than to write a work of great benefit to mankind and to
bring the nature of things to light for all men? I do not, however, think the
attempt to tell mankind of these matters a good thing, except in the case of
some few who are capable of discovering the truth for themselves with lit-
tle guidance. In the case of the rest to do so would excite in some an un-
plays daily in the administration of justice." JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUrOR: A
SEARCH FOR IDENTITY xv (1980).
38. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
607, 626-27 (1999).
39. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 76 (1991).
40. FREEDMAN, supra note 32, at 216 (quoting Irving Younger, Memoir of a Prosecutor.
Commentary, vol. 62, no. 4, p. 66 (Oct. 1976)).
41. Harvey A. Silvergate & Andrew Good, Starr Teachers, THE CHAMPION, Aug. 1999,
at http://209.70.38.3/public.nsf/championarticles/99augO3?opendocument (quoting Justice
Robert H. Jackson). As Mr. Freedman has indicated, none of the ethical codes even deal with
this problem. FREEDMAN, supra note 32, at 217.
42. Green, supra note 38, at 628 (quoting Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 3 I
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 4 (1940)).
43. CLARENCE DARROW. ON THE DEATH PENALTY 36 (Chicago Historical Bookworks
1991) (1924).
44. DARROW, supra note 1, at 316.
45. Id. at 312.
[Vol. 38
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justified contempt in a thoroughly offensive fashion, in others lofty and
vain hopes, as if they had acquired some awesome lore.'*
As Plato stated, the concept of justice cannot be defined--either one
truly understands it or one does not. One cannot tell another how to act in a
just manner. The "pretty" ' standard of doing "justice" is vague, leaving
prosecutors to be guided only by their morality." "Some will decide that jus-
tice lies in conviction at all costs; others will bend over backwards to vindi-
cate defendants' rights.. . ."' The vague norm of doing "justice" becomes
subject to the varying interpretations by different prosecutors with different
morals and thus becomes less valuable as a source of guidance in the role of
the prosecutor." The standard is so vague that it is unenforceable, thus giv-
ing prosecutors little incentive to comply. 1 The prosecutor's duties, to do
"justice" and yet to be an adversary in our modified adversarial system, are
"inherently contradictory-and perhaps hopeless."' Prosecutors begin to de-
fine their role of "seeking justice" in the same manner as do attorneys in the
private sector-in terms of wins.
II. SCORE KEEPING MENTALITY
"The competitive and combative nature of modem adversary proceed-
ings, often staged in the glare of intense media coverage, has changed many
prosecutors from champions of justice to advocates of victory." 3 Prosecutors
as well as defense attorneys do their best to win.' As retired Illinois Su-
preme Court Justice Dom Rizzi has stated, some prosecutors overLealously
seek convictions rather than seeking justice." Prosecutors readily admit that
46. PLATO, Letter VII, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 1589: 34 !d-c (Edith Ham-
ilton and Huntington Cairns eds., L.A. Post trans., Princeton University Press 1971).
47. Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice and Adminis-
trator of Justice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1301, 1305 (1996). Mr. Bresler describes the stan-
dard by which prosecutors are guided-to do justice-as a "pretty phrase." Id. at 1301.
48. Zacharias, supra note 39, at 48.
49. Id
50. Id. at 103.
51. Id. at 104.
52. Id
53. LAWLESS, supra note 30.
54. Thomas A. Hagemann, Confessions From a Scorekeeper: A Reply to Mr. Bresler, 10
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 151, 154 n.8 (1996). Winning is an important goal for the prosecutor in
our adversarial system. Norman Lefstein, Reform of Defense Representation in Capital
Cases: The Indiana Experience and Its Implications for the Nation. 29 IND. L. REv. 495. 511
(1996) (quoting a former prosecutor with substantial experience prosecuting death penalty
cases).
55. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial and Error: Break Rules, Be Promoted. Se-
ries Five in a Five Part Series, Cm. TRiB., Jan. 14. 1999, at N I,
wysiwyg:l291http:lchicagotribune.comlne. . ./ws/item/0, 1308.21398-21721-21728,00.html.
Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial and Error: Tile Verdict: Dishonor, Series One in a
Five Part Series, CHI. TRiB., Jan. 8, 1999, at C1, wysiwyg://l l/http://chicagotribune.com
7
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winning is significant to them. 6 They try really hard to obtain convictions."
Prosecutors view the convictions they obtain against defendants as a meas-
ure of their success. 8 For instance, the U.S. Attorney's Office keeps track of
its successful "batting average."59 Some prosecutors' offices even measure
wins and losses, next to each prosecutor's name on a board, with green
stickers for victories and red stickers for losses.' Contests like the "two-ton"
contest have developed as a game among prosecutors to see who could be
the first to convict men and women weighing two tons.6 In one prosecutors'
office, prosecutors must write and file a report with the district attorney if
they lose a case.6' Sadly, though prosecutors keep track of their "wins," no
one keeps track of their losses on appeal, which occur because prosecutors
have exceeded the bounds of "justice" to seek a conviction. 3
Criminal defense attorney William Murphy said, "[tjhere are a lot of
good prosecutors out there who want to win and can take a loss. And there
are prosecutors who so don't want to lose they would rather win dirty."' For
those prosecutors, winning is everything and they will do it at any cost. The
cost is committing misconduct in order to win.6 Most prosecutors do not de-
/ne.. ./ws/item/0,1308,21398-21420-21467,00.html (quoting Harvard University Law Profes-
sor Alan Dershowitz, "Winning has become more important than doing justice. Nobody runs
for Senate saying I did justice.").
56. Mr. Thomas A. Hagemann, a brash critic of Mr. Kenneth Bresler's article criticizing
fellow prosecutors for keeping score rather than doing justice, made Mr. Bresler's point per-
haps better than he himself did. Mr. Hagemann said,
winning matters. And, if winning matters, then we must motivate winning.., and
since we don't pay most prosecutors enough, what is the harm behind allowing
them the motivation of not wanting to lose and keeping score? Or of allowing ex-
prosecutors to talk about their record when their career is behind them?
Hagemann, supra note 54, at 154.
57. Id. at 153.
58. Elizabeth Glazer, Crime Busting and Crime Prevention: A Dual Role for Prosecu-
tors, 15 CRIM. JUST. 11 (2001). Ms. Glazer was the head of her office's organized crime sec-
tion a few years ago. One of her fellow prosecutors began each conversation by asking the
other prosecutor whom they had put in jail that day. He was measuring success by arrests and
convictions. Id.
59. LAWLESS, supra note 30, at 31.
60. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial and Error: The Flip Side of a Fair Trial.
Series Two in a Five Part Series, CHI. TRIB., Jan. II, 1999, at NI,
wysiwyg://20/http://chicagotribune.comlne.. ./ws/item/0, 1308,21398-21543-2153 1,00.html.
This practice happened in the Illinois State Attorney's Office two decades ago. Since that
time, misconduct inspired by this drive for convictions still continues today. Id.
61. Id.
62. Evan Moore, Justice Under Fire: 'Win at all Costs' is Smith County's Rule, Critics
Claim, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 11, 2000, at A 1, available at 2000 WL 4304479.
63. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 55, at C 1.
64. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 60 at N I.
65. Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Winning at Any Cost: Prosecuto-
rial Excess Distorting America's Justice System (Feb. 9, 1999) (on file with author).
66. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 55 at C 1. Legal scholars, judges, defense attorneys.
and even prosecutors agree that the reason prosecutors cheat is to win. Id.
290 [Vol. 38
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liberately hatch "diabolical plots to convict the innocent."' Rather, most
prosecutors are really good people who are just doing what they see as their
job-to convict criminals and thereby reduce crime."1 Most criminal cases
involve guilty defendants, and thus prosecutors see their misconduct as lead-
ing to a "just" result-the conviction of a factually guilty defendant.' One
prosecutor has equated convictions with justice because the defendants were
factually guilty," regardless of whether the process itself was just against
any particular defendant.
After obtaining these "wins," prosecutors keep score. Newspapers," law
review articles' 2 and books' document this scorekeeping mentality. Some
cases are "sure winners" and thus prosecutors make ridiculous plea offers to
defendants, knowing they will be rejected, and the prosecutor will have to
take the case to trial." Prosecutors experience a "temptation... to 'win the
big one' and reap the rewards."' Some prosecutors have even been accused of
coaching witnesses to perjure themselves in order to win murder convic-
tions.76 As reporters Ken Armstrong and Maurice Possley have documented:
With impunity, prosecutors across the country have violated their oaths
and the law, committing the worst kinds of deception in the most serious
cases. They have prosecuted black men, hiding evidence the real killers
67. Dershowitz, supra note 29, at x.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Hagemann, supra note 54, at 153. As a federal prosecutor. Mr. Hagcmann believed
"factually guilty defendants should lose" and that he was paid to seek convictions. His reason
for seeking convictions was that the defendants he pursued "were, based on appearances, evi-
dence, reasonable inferences, and [his and his] supervisor's best judgement, factually guilty of
the crimes charged." Mr. Hagemann said that while some may answer that "justice" was done
when a factually guilty defendant goes free, it is not something that our "justice" system could
handle if it happened too often. Id.
71. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 60, at NI. An ex-prosecutor and now a defense
lawyer, Michael Goggin's record was 58 wins, 2 losses, and 2 hung juries. His partner Gregg
Owen, also Goggin's partner to several cases of prosecutor misconduct, had a record of 62
wins and 2 losses in his trial of 64 cases. Owen claimed that he and Goggin never lost to-
gether as a team-they won almost 40 cases in a row. They also accumulated a record for
cases reversed due to prosecutor misconduct--4. Id. Jack Skeen. a district attorney for Smith
County, Texas, also has a record for winning. He liked to win so much that he made his thirty
assistant district attorneys write and file reports with him if they actually lost a case. Moore,
supra note 63.
72. Hagemann, supra note 54, at 151. Mr. Hagemann admits, "I keep score." In fact, his
score as a former Assistant United States Attorney in Los Angeles, California, from 1985 to
1991, was "12-0." Incidentally and quite appropriately for a defense attorney, he keeps score.
As of the date his article was published in 1996, he was "1-0." Id.
73. LAWLESS, supra note 30, at 31.
74. Id. at 23.
75. Id. at xvii.
76. J. Harry Jones, Grand Jury Indicts Ex-prosecutor. SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB.. Feb. 16,
2001, at Al (Mr. Peter J. Longanbach, a former District Attorney in San Diego. California,
has been accused, by a criminal defense attorney who filed allegations against Longanbach. of
suboming perjury of a witness in the 1996 murder trial of David Genzler).
9
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were white. They have prosecuted a wife, hiding evidence her husband
committed suicide. They have prosecuted parents, hiding evidence their
daughter was killed by wild dogs. They do it to win. They do it because
they won't get punished .
This conviction seeking, win-loss tallying mentality promotes prosecu-
tor misconduct. Prosecutors continue racking up "notches" ' in their records,
with various motivations for doing so. Some prosecutors are motivated to
keep score as a measure of their own success, while others use their record to
advance their career or campaign for higher office.
III. MOTIVATIONS FOR KEEPING SCORE
Prosecutors have various motivations for keeping and publicizing their
"score." They reveal their tallies of wins in their resumes, to journalists, in
political campaign advertisements, at cocktail parties, and in "other opportu-
nities for self-promotion. '79 Their motivations for doing so are professional,
self-promotional, and political."0 The prosecutor has a motivation to continue
seeking convictions."'
A. Measure of Success
Many prosecutors measure their success by the number of wins they
tally. If they did their job without caring whether they get the credit for a
"win," perhaps then justice would be served. As Ronald Regan's plaque in
the Oval Office was inscribed: "It's remarkable how much can be accom-
plished if no one cares about who gets the credit."82 Unfortunately, prosecu-
tors get wrapped up in winning because they do care who gets the credit.
They want to get credit for convicting factually guilty defendants. They seek
the praise of fellow prosecutors who recognize their high conviction rates.8
Convictions are a measure of the prosecutor's success. 4 "Good trial lawyers,
including prosecutors, have big egos. They are driven to succeed [because it
is a] necessary tool of the trade. A little chest-pounding, some war stories
and tales of wins, losses, and won-lost records come with the territory.""
77. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 55, at NI.
78. Guerra v. Collins, 916 F. Supp. 620, 637 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (the court concluded by
saying that the prosecutors' intentional "misconduct was designed and calculated to obtain a
conviction and another 'notch in their guns' despite the overwhelming evidence" that another
man was the real killer).
79. Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial": When Prosecutors Keep Score of Crniinal
Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETtIICS 537, 541 (1996).
80. Id. at 542.
81. Id.
82. In Profile: M. David Barber, 34 PROSECUTOR 18 (2000).
83, Armstrong & Possley, supra note 60, at NI.
84. Glazer, supra note 58.
85. Hagemann, supra note 54, at 152.
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The drive to win is even greater in the context of high-profile and pro-
fessionally high-stakes capital cases."6 Charging a case as a capital offense
"increases the chances of winning, [but] also increases the embarrassment
and publicity of losing, making it all the more important for... prosecutors
to search for additional ways to win.""n Losing a death penalty case "gener-
ates negative publicity [for the prosecutor] and is seen as 'a knock to the
prosecutor."'38 On the other hand, having an impressive record of convic-
tions enhances the prosecutor's job security. '
Prosecutors become motivated by their own self-interests to win cases
rather than their interests in serving the public.' The Supreme Court of
Michigan said:
The prosecuting officer represents the public interest, which can never be
promoted by the conviction of the innocent. His object like that of the
court, should be simply justice; and he has no right to sacrifice this to any
pride of professional success. And however strong may be his belief of the
prisoner's guilt, he must remember that, though unfair means may happen
to result in doing justice to the prisoner in the particular case, yet, justice
so attained, is unjust and dangerous to the whole communty.
The prosecutor has no right to sacrifice justice to his or her own profes-
sional success by seeking convictions, against even a factually guilty defen-
dant, in a manner that is procedurally unjust.
B. Career Advancement or Promotions
The prosecutor faces additional motivations for seeking convictions and
keeping score. Successful conviction rates serve to advance a prosecutor's
career by leading to promotions. Promotions for subordinate prosecutors de-
pend on their "scores" for convictions. ' Winning gets rewarded while mis-
conduct goes unpunished.93 The underlying message to prosecutors is, as
Alan M. Dershowitz has stated:
86. Wayne A. Logan, Declaring Life at the Crossroads of Death: Victims' Anti-Death
Penalty Views and Prosecutors' Charging Decisions, 18 CRLM. JUST. EriuCs 41, Part III(1999) (citing Stacy Caplow, Wlhat if There is No Client?: Prosecutors as "Counselors" of
Crime Victims, 5 CLINICAL L. REv. 1, 11 n.36 (1998)).
87. James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, I00 COLU.I. L. REv. 2030, 2098
(2000).
88. Lefstein, supra note 54, at 512 (quoting a defense attorney with substantial expen-
ence as a prosecutor in capital cases).
89. Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Ac-
countability?, 83 VA. L. REv. 939, 966 (1997).
90. Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Gov-
ernment Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REv. 789. 834 (2000).
91. Hurd v. People, 1872 WL 3237, at *4 (Mich. 1872).
92. Zacharias, supra note 39, at 58 n.63.
93. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial and Error: Reversal of Fortune, Series
Four in a Five Part Series, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 1999 at N1. wysiwyg:/J26/httpJ/chicago trib-
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three-fold: (1) if misconduct is necessary to convict a guilty defendant, by
all means do it; (2) try not to get caught, because that may complicate mat-
ters; (3) but if you do get caught, you can count on the court to bail you
out either by ignoring the misconduct or by invoking the 'harmless error'
rule.9'
Even if a good prosecutor does not want to seek a conviction, against a
defendant that the prosecutor believes is innocent, the system is not set up
for the prosecutor to do so." Prosecutors who do not want to get caught up in
the scorekeeping, conviction-seeking mentality often do anyway because be-
ing the whistle blower is against the prosecutor's own self-interest in promo-
tions or career advancement.96
Prosecutors who have committed misconduct, in the pursuit for addi-
tional "notches" of conviction on their record, have been promoted or have
seen their careers advance. Some have become supervisors for the state's at-
torney office,97 circuit court judges,98 appellate court judges," inspector gen-
erals,w congressmen,'0 1 and even chief disciplinary counsel" ° presiding over
une.com/ne.. ./ws/iteml0,1308,21398-21645-21660,00.html (quoting Mr. Scott Arthur. a
former prosecutor in the Ford Heights 4 case. Prosecutors continually get "promoted rather
than reprimanded.").
94. Dershowitz, supra note 29, at xii.
95. Telephone interview with Kenneth Bresler, Trial Attorney in the Fraud Section,
Criminal Division, U.S. Justice Department (Feb. 9, 2001).
96. Id. Mr. Bressler was the prosecutor on a case in which he believed the defendant was
innocent. When he suggested the possibility-that the defendant might be innocent-to his
superiors, he was reprimanded and thrown off the case. In another case in which he believed
one of the defendants was innocent, his boss told him, "If you don't believe in the case, don't
take it to trial," and pulled him off of the case. Mr. Bressler said that was his impetus to writ-
ing the article. Id.
97. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 60, at NI (former prosecutor Michael Goggin had
six cases reversed because of misconduct-more than any other Cook County prosecutor-
yet he became a supervisor for the Illinois State Attorney's Office).
98. Id. (prosecutor Nick Ford was named Cook County, Illinois judge merely two
months after his 1995 murder conviction of Christopher Heynerd was reversed because he
improperly argued to the jury that he would be fired if his witnesses lied and therefore the
jury should believe his witnesses). Armstrong & Possley, supra note 55, at N I. Former prose-
cutor Carol Pearce McCarthy's misconduct in two of her cases that were overturned by the
appellate court was described as "inexcusable." Yet, she was promoted to deputy chief of the
narcotics prosecutions bureau and later became a judge in juvenile court. Id.
99. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 55. Ironically, after being scolded by the Illinois
Appellate Court for prosecutor misconduct, former prosecutor Patrick Quinn became a judge
on the Illinois Appellate Court. Obviously he is now in a position to review cases of prosecu-
tor misconduct.
100. 1d. Ex-prosecutor Alexander Vroustouris' murder conviction was thrown out be-
cause he defied the judge's order to refrain from making a certain improper argument in clos-
ing. He landed ajob as Chicago's inspector general. Id.
101. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 55, at CI (former prosecutor George "Buddy"
Darden withheld evidence in a case against seven men who were later exonerated, but were
nonetheless convicted and received sentences of death. Mr. Darden went on to be a Georgia
congressman).
102. Id. In New Mexico, former prosecutor Virginia Ferrara became chief disciplinary
counsel and now polices other lawyers for misconduct after herself failing to disclose evi-
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other lawyers for misconduct. These career advancements happen in ordi-
nary criminal cases and even more so in high-profile cases.' 3 The position of
prosecutor is often sought for the "boost it can give subsequent careers.""
Because career advancement and promotions are based upon conviction
rates, prosecutors seek convictions to boost their "score" rather than seeking
justice."
C. Campaigns for Re-election or Higher Office
When prosecutors get wrapped up in the scorekeeping, conviction-
seeking mentality, they use these records to further promote careers in the
political arena. As Clarence Darrow once said:
A prosecutor hopes and expects to be judge, and after that he will aspire to
be governor, then senator, and President, in their regular turn. To accom-
plish this noble ambition he must in each position give the people what
they want, and more; and there are no rungs in the ladder of fame uon
which lawyers can plant their feet like the dead bodies of their victims.
A prosecutor must give the people what they want-someone who is
"tough on crime."" Seeking the death penalty helps prove the prosecutor
running for election is not 'soft on crime' like his opponents.'" Prosecutors
seek convictions to campaign on them by reminding voters of their notorious
cases.'" Prosecutors use their "wins," especially those in the death penalty
context, in campaign advertisements."' Campaigning on their trial success-
dence of another suspect in a murder case. Id.
103. Gerald F. Uelmen, Leaks, Gags and Shields: Taking Responsibility, 37 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 943, 950 (1997).
104. Berenson, supra note 90, at 808 (quoting JAMES EIsENSmN, COUNSEL. FOR THE
UNTED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSiEMS 174 (1978)).
105. Id. at 808-09 (citing Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining,
36 U. CII. L. REv. 50, 106 (1968-1969)).
106. CLARENCE DARROW, THE STORY OF MY LiFE 352 (1934).
107. Former Pennsylvania State Attorney General Emic Preate told lawmakers that the
tough-on-crime mentality along with motivations of "revenge had weakened constitutional
safeguards against executing the innocent." Patricia Manson, For Defense, Reform Tide is a
Buoyant Force, CH. DAILY L. BuLL., Apr. 22, 2000, at 1. "Politicians of all stripes bow be-
fore the alter of 'tough on crime' rhetoric as a surefire means to boost their clecctability."
James McCloskey, The Death Penalty: A Personal View. 1996 CRL' . JUST. EHIuCs P2, avail-
able at 1996 WL 13108692.
108. Logan, supra note 86 (citing Wise, Prosecutors Want Death Penalty: Qualms
Voiced About Costs, Time, Training of Lawyers, NYU Mar. 3. 1995. at 1) (quoting a publicly
elected prosecutor).
109. Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the Death Penalty:
The Ethics of Prosecutorial Candidate's Campaigning on Capital Convictions, 7 GEo. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 941, 946-947 (1994).
110. For example, California Attorney General John K. Van de Kamp ran a television
advertisement with a gas chamber in the background. Meanwhile the announcer declared that
while Van de Kamp was a two-term District Attorney for Los Angeles County and two-term
Attorney General of California, he "put or kept 277 murders on Death Row." John Balzar.
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their convictions-has been deemed by some as essential to be elected as a
prosecutor."' Indeed, examples can be readily seen in newspapers at election
time."' There are prosecutors, however, who do not feel the need to resort to
campaigning on their conviction records."' For those who do campaign on
their conviction records, however, it is essential that they maximize their
convictions.'
Prosecutors keep score of their convictions as a measure of their own
success among their colleagues, to promote their own careers, and to cam-
paign on them later for re-election to prosecutor or higher offices. Arguably,
this scorekeeping mentality leads to seeking and obtaining convictions at all
costs to the defendants-whether factually guilty or entirely innocent. The
result is prosecutorial misconduct and injustice.
IV. WINNING AT ALL COSTS
As Martin Luther King, Jr. notoriously said in his Letter from Birming-
ham Jail, "[i]njustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.""' Prosecu-
torial misconduct is a threat to justice because it infects the entire criminal
justice system where every defendant has a constitutional right to a fair trial,
whether the defendant is factually guilty or entirely innocent."6 When a
prosecutor engages in scorekeeping, the prosecutor has "an incentive to cut
constitutional and ethical corners to secure a guilty verdict. . . ""' Some
prosecutors get swept up in their cases and do not pause to question the va-
lidity or strength of their evidence."' Instead of pursuing justice, they give in
Van de Kamp Ads Focus on Death Row, Will Air Today, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1990, 1990
WL 2421833. An advertisement for re-election of prosecutor Chuck Credo declared that there
were "four very good reasons" to re-elect him: "Johnny Taylor, executed. Benjamin Berry,
executed ..." Nightline: Crime and Punishment: A Matter of Life and Death (ABC television
broadcast Sept. 13, 2000) [hereinafter Nightline] (transcript on file with the author).
111. Zacharias, supra note 39, at 58 n.63 ("For elected prosecutors, publicity about trial
successes is essential to campaigns.").
112. See Special Section: District Attorney, DENVER POST, Oct. 22, 2000, at 47, available
at 2000 WL 25832478. District Attorney Dave Thomas, in answer to the question why he
thought he was the best candidate, said he was "a tough prosecutor [and] personally tried
seven cases during [his] tenure ... all with successful results." District Attorney Sara F. Law
ran for re-election on the high conviction rate of her office and cited those rates-"DUI of-
fense (91 percent), felony assaults (91 percent), and murder (100 percent)." Id.
113. Joe D'Alessandro, a Florida State Attorney who has been re-elected eight times, has
never campaigned on his conviction record for death penalty cases. Nightline, supra note I 10.
114. Richman, supra note 89.
115. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham Jail, in T11E NORTON RiiADI:R 887
(Arthur M. Eastman ed., 8" ed. 1992).
116. LAWLESS, supra note 30, at 2.
117. Bresler, supra note 79, at 543.
118. Nightline, supra note 110 (Ms. Laurie White was a former prosecutor in New Or-
leans and is now a defense attorney. She said prosecutors do not knowingly pursue convic-
tions against innocent defendants but rather get swept up in the cases to the point that they do
not question their evidence.).
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to the urge to "pound an opponent into submission.""' In the effort to pound
their opponents, prosecutors engage in misconduct. The misconduct is "often
concealed and difficult to expose."'" More effort is often expended by
prosecutors to cover up their wrongdoing than to correct it. 2' Prosecutors
engage in hiding evidence or not disclosing evidence, procuring perjury
from witnesses, and other forms of misconduct as they get wrapped up in
their scorekeeping mentality of seeking convictions.
A. Hiding Evidence or Failing to Disclose Evidence
Cases where prosecutors withheld or failed to disclose evidence, in the
pursuit of convictions, abound. For example, in Alcorta v. State of Texas, the
prosecutor was aware that its star witness was sexually involved with the de-
fendant's wife-whom the defendant was prosecuted for killing after he
came upon her and the star witness in a parked car, kissing.'" The prosecutor
also coached the witness not to volunteer that he was sexually intimate with
the victim and actually suborned perjury from the witness by asking him a
series of questions on direct examination, to which the witness lied in his re-
sponses and concealed this relationship.'" Luckily, the court, in a per curium
opinion, reversed and remanded the case to accord the defendant due proc-
ess.
1 24
Prosecutors have also failed to disclose documentary evidence such as
statements from witnesses. One prosecutor was actually suspended from the
bar for two years stayed and placed on probation for an equal amount of time
after she committed misconduct in a murder trial against three defendants
when she did not disclose a key statement.'" Another prosecutor kept secret
a statement from an eyewitness, the victim's brother, who told the police his
killers were white when the prosecution was pursuing a black man as the de-
fendant."6 Prosecutors have even gone so far, in their pursuit for convictions,
as to hide physical evidence like the knife, gun, or pipe with which the vic-
119. Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. FERC, 962 F.2d 45,48 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
120. TExAS DEFENDER SERvICE, REPORT: A STATE OF DENIAL: TExAs JUSTICE AND TrE
DEATH PENALTY, CHAPTER TWO: OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT: A DEuBERATE ATrACK ON TIlE
TRUni, Part I, at http://www.texasdefender.org/study/chapter2.htm.
121. Manson, supra note 107 (quoting Former Illinois Supreme Court Justice John L.
Nickels).
122. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 28 (1957).
123. Id at31.
124. Id at 32.
125. CALIFORNIA BAR JOURNAL (November 2000), available at htp:llwww.calbar.org/
2cbj/00nov/attdisc.htm (the prosecutor was Vita Marie Mandalla, #105200 of Woodland,
California).
126. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 55, at CI (the case took place in New York where
prosecutors won against two black men, Sammy Thomas and Willie Gene. The prosecutor
that committed misconduct was Peter Coming. Incidentally, he later went on to become a
judge).
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tim allegedly first attacked or threatened the defendant.' In one prosecution,
a jacket, seized from another suspect (not the defendant), which matched an
eyewitness description of the killer, remained in the trunk of the police offi-
cer during the defendant's trial.'28 Prosecutors have withheld evidence that a
blood-spatter expert supported the defendant's claim that she did not shoot
her husband, but that he shot himself.'29 Prosecutors have withheld evidence
suggesting a police informant framed the defendant 3' and even that the real
killer was their star witness. 3 ' Prosecutors have also failed to reveal immu-
nity arrangements made with their star witnesses in exchange for their favor-
able testimony, as well as evidence that would damage or destroy their wit-
nesses' credibility.' Prosecutors have even concealed evidence that the
defendant was not the real killer but someone else was and argued alterna-
tive theories of who was the killer, to convict two people, in two separate
cases, rather than only one.'33 One prosecutor went to such lengths to with-
127. Id. (incidents like this have happened in Indiana, South Carolina, Arizona, Colo-
rado, and Illinois. These are not just isolated incidents in one "bad" jurisdiction).
128. ACLU, THREE FREED FROM NORTH CAROLINAS DEATH Row, Aug. 17, 2000, at
http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/wO8l7OOa.html (visited Feb. 13, 2001). The case involved
U.S. Army Sgt. Tim Hennis whose conviction for rape and murder of a woman and her two
children was reversed and whose case was remanded to the trial court where a jury found him
not guilty. The eyewitness identified a man who wore a jacket with specific writing on it. An-
other man was in the neighborhood at the time of the murders and had in fact been questioned
by the police who seized the jacket from him. The evidence was not revealed during Mr
Hennis' first trial. Id.
129. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 55, at Cl.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Rhode Island v. DiPrete, 1997 WL 105107 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1997) This case docu-
ments several instances of withholding evidence. The court reversed and stated, "the state
cannot be allowed to benefit from having acted in a manner that is less than constitutional and
ethical in the pursuit of convictions.I. . ." d. (emphasis added). Mr. Hansen refers to separate
rulings in June 1993 from U.S. District Court Judges James Holderman and Suzanne Conlon
in which federal prosecutors withheld evidence that their star witnesses received special fa-
vors in exchange for their cooperative testimony and used drugs while in custody. Mark Han-
sen, New El Rukn Trials: Prosecutor Misconduct Cited, 79 A.B.A. 42 (1993). Senior Justice
Department Prosecutor William Lynch had one of his cases dismissed by U.S. District Judge
James Ideman for prosecutor misconduct in withholding evidence from the defendants be-
cause the evidence attacked the credibility of his star witness. NAT'L ASs'N OF CRrM. DEr.
LAWYERS, RELUCTANT DISCIPLINE, at http://209.70.38.3/PUBLIC/ABUSEICROO0006.htm.
133. Jacobs v. Scott, 31 F.3d 1319, 1322 (S.D. Tex. 1994), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1067
(1995). In the trial against Jesse Dewayne Jacobs, the prosecutor used the defendant's confes-
sion to the police to convict him as the killer of his sister's lover's wife. In a subsequent
criminal case by the same prosecutor against Jacob's sister, the prosecutor argued that she
was the real killer-not Jacobs. The prosecution called police officers that testified that cer-
tain portions of Jacob's confession were not true. The prosecution also called Jacobs himself
to testify that his sister was the one who killed the victim. The Supreme Court denied cert.
when the appellate court found that the alternative arguments of the prosecutor did not consti-
tute "new evidence" entitling him to federal habeas corpus relief. Two justices dissented-
Stevens and Ginsburg. Id. Sadly, Jacobs received his sentence of death, for a crime he did not
commit, on January 4, 1995. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STATISTICS, at
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/statistics/deathrow/executed/jacbos.jpg. In his last statement, Ja-
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hold or conceal evidence that he ordered helpful evidence to be deleted from
reports, made illegible photocopies of documentary evidence, buried 300
pages of evidence harmful to his case in 18,000 pages of other evidence, and
withheld the names of witnesses."s As these examples demonstrate, not only
do prosecutors hide physical and documentary evidence in order to win, but
they also suborn perjury from their star witnesses.
B. Subornation of Perjury
Prosecutors who fall into the trap of seeking convictions and not justice
suborn perjury from police officers called to testify against defendants'" and
from other witnesses as well.'36 When the defendant can prove that the
prosecutor permitted witnesses to lie and did nothing to correct the perjury,
reversals are supposed to be "virtually automatic.""' Prosecutors have been
admonished against suborning perjury or producing any other type of false
evidence in order to obtain a conviction.'3 t In Napue v. Illinois, the Court
said that a prosecutor "may not knowingly use false evidence, including
false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction."'3 9 Despite being admonished
against these types of unethical and unconstitutional conduct, prosecutors
continue to suborn perjury in order to obtain convictions.
C. General Prosecutor Misconduct
Prosecutors have been accused of a host of other forms of misconduct
ranging from inappropriately badgering truthful witnesses to shape their tes-
timony into lies, threatening witnesses by handcuffing them until they agree
to provide cooperative testimony, and cooperating with police in repeated
searches of witnesses' homes in order to get them to provide favorable tes-
cobs said, "I have committed lots of sins in my life, but I am not guilty of this crime." Id.
134. J. Harry Jones, Judge Voids 5 Convictions in Sports-Agent Fraud Case, State Inves-
tigating Retired Prosecutor For Misconduct, SAN DIEGo UNION TRIB.. Jan. 20, 2001,
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.comlsandiegolmain .... html?/QIID--000000067255677&FMT=FT&F
MTS=FT (San Diego County Superior Court Judge Judith Hayes held that ex-prosccutor Pe-
ter J. Longanbach committed prosecutor misconduct to win convictions).
135. FREEDMAN, supra note 32, at 225.
136. ACLU, THREE FREED FROM NORTH CAROLINAS DEATH Row, supra note 128.
Charles Munsey was convicted of murdering a woman. During his trial, prosecutors suborned
perjury from their star witness who claimed Munsey confessed the murder to him while they
were in Central Prison together. The witness had never even been in Central Prison and
prosecutors knew it. Another man later confessed to the killing, and Munsey's death sentence
conviction was overturned. Sadly, while awaiting a new trial, Munsey died from lung cancer.
Id
137. United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445,456 (1991) (citations omitted).
138. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
139. Id
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timony, to knowingly using false testimony and withholding material excul-
patory evidence."' °
Despite the prosecutors' numerous forms of misconduct, there are little
consequences for their unconstitutional and unethical behavior that results
from the win-loss tally-keeping mentality."'
V. LITTLE CONSEQUENCES FOR PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT
Prosecutors commit misconduct in the drive to win-and because they
will not get punished.' 2 The only check on prosecutor misconduct is the mo-
rality of the individual prosecutor.' 3 That check is clearly not enough. As
Ken Armstrong and Maurice Possley from the Chicago Tribune found after
extensive research:
In an environment where prosecutors recite conviction rates like boxers
touting win-loss records, the risks are negligible for those who break the
rules of a fair trial. Winning a conviction can accelerate a prosecutor's ca-
reer, but getting rebuked on appeal will rarely stall it, contributing to a cul-
ture that fosters misconduct. And the deterrents that confront prosecutors
are fearsome only in theory. ' "
Prosecutors face almost no discipline for their outrageous misconduct."'
In addition, they have immunity from civil suits by defendants seeking some
type of retribution.' 6 They are not likely to be criminally prosecuted for their
misconduct either."' When the appellate courts reverse their convictions due
to prosecutor misconduct, they receive "professional courtesy." The Su-
preme Court reviews prosecutor misconduct cases with a pathetic standard
140. Guerra v. Collins, 916 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Tex. 1995). This case is a particularly
egregious example of prosecutor misconduct in which the defendant's writ of habeas corpus
was granted. Mr. Ricardo Aldape Guerra was ultimately released from prison on April 16.
1997, after serving 15 years on death row. Unfortunately, his freedom was short-lived; he
died in an automobile accident on August 22, 1997. Man Who Avoided Execution is Killed in
Auto Accident, AUSTiN AM. STATESMAN, Aug. 22, 1997, at B8.
141. See infra Part V.
142. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 55, at Cl. Prosecutors who commit misconduct in
the drive to win should be punished under several ethical rules, including ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.4(c). Ironically, prosecutors like Jefferson County. Colorado.
Chief Deputy District Attorney Mark C. Pautler get punished under the same rule for coaxing
a triple murderer and rapist into surrendering by posing as a public defender to get the killer
to let hostages go unharmed. Stephen Tarnoff, Hard Line on a White Lie: Colorado panel dis-
ciplines prosecutor who helped coax triple murderer into surrendering, 87 ABA JOURNAL 32
(2001).
143. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 55, at CI (quoting Bennett Gershman, Professor
of Law at Pace University in White Plains).
144. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 55, at NI.
145. See infra Part V.A-C.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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called "harmless error."'" In essence, prosecutors have no deterrents to their
unethical and unconstitutional behavior.
A. Little Discipline
Prosecutors receive little discipline from their state bar agencies when
they commit misconduct. "In circumstances where life and liberty are at
stake... most state bar associations are ill-equipped to review the ethical
behavior of prosecutors, and they almost never do."" Perhaps the state bar
associations do not have the extensive time and money it would take to
prosecute all of the cases of prosecutor misconduct.'" It is more likely, how-
ever, that the reason prosecutors are not disciplined for their misconduct
very often is because the trial records do not usually reveal their miscon-
duct,"' unless it is particularly egregious. For example, evidence the prose-
cutor conceals from the jury and the defense counsel is obviously not docu-
mented in the trial transcript, nor is the fact that the prosecutor suborned
peIjury from certain witnesses. Often, the only person who will know about
the misconduct is the prosecutor engaged in such behavior.i "
Sometimes the misconduct is brought to the attention of the appellate
courts that reverse convictions based on prosecutors' misconduct. Out of 381
convictions that were reversed on appeal, due to prosecutors' misconduct in
failing to disclose evidence and submitting false evidence, since 1963, not
one single prosecutor received a public sanction from the state disciplinary
agency." Private sanctions by state disciplinary agencies, in the form of
admonitions or reprimands, are obviously unpublished.'' Investigations of
prosecutors are kept confidential if they do not result in disciplinary action.'"
148. See infra Part V.E.
149. JIM DwYER, PEmIR NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 181 (2000).
The State of Colorado's lawyer-discipline panel did, however, review the uncthical behavior
of one of its prosecutors who lied when he misrepresented himself as a public defender in or-
der to keep a dangerous criminal in a hostage situation from further hurting anyone. Tamoff,
supra note 142. The disciplinary panel found, in a 2-1 decision, that Jefferson County Chief
Deputy District Attorney Mark C. Pautler violated both ABA Rule 8.4(c)- which prohibits
conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation-and Colorado Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 4.3, which prohibits "deceptive conduct by a lawyer when dealing
on behalf of a client or with a person not represented by counsel." Id. The disciplinary panel
said, "[t]he ends do not justify the means." Id If disciplinary boards can use ABA Rule 8.4(c)
to discipline a lawyer who makes an exception to the rule in order to save people's lives, then
the disciplinary boards should also enforce this rule against prosecutors who make exceptions
to the rule in order to promote their own lives.
150. More resources would be consumed in the investigation of prosecutonal usconduct
than is spent by state bars to investigate ethical violations by private counsel. Zachanas. supra
note 39, at 105.
151. lI at 106.
152. Id
153. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 55, at Cl.
154. Id
155. Id.
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It is therefore difficult to determine whether prosecutors generally receive
absolutely no disciplinary sanctions or merely receive low-level sanctions
like private reprimands for prosecutor misconduct. A search of the local state
disciplinary agency's records for disciplinary action since August 1998 pro-
duced only one record of a prosecutor who received public sanctions for
misconduct.'56 The prosecutor was ordered to take the MPRE again within
the next year, received a two year sentence which was stayed, and received a
two year probation for her misconduct in a murder conviction in which she
failed to disclose evidence to the defense" 7 In Illinois, only one public sanc-
tion was issued against a prosecutor in twenty-six years.'58 Sometimes, courts
do give appropriate sanctions. For example, San Diego Prosecutor L. Forrest
Price was suspended from the practice of law for two years after he forged
evidence in a 1976 double murder trial.5 9
Even though prosecutors violate their ethical obligations to seek justice,
not convictions, disciplinary agencies are reluctant to do anything to cure the
problem of prosecutor misconduct. Prosecutors who commit misconduct
while engulfed in the scorekeeping, conviction-seeking mentality have little
deterrent to this type of behavior."W "The future prospects of vigorous en-
forcement of the prosecutorial duty [to seek justice, not convictions] are
dim."' 6' Given that prosecutors are not deterred by threats of being publicly
156. CALIFORNIA BAR JOURNAL (Nov 2000), available at http://www.calbar.org/
2cbj/00nov/attdisc.htm.
157. Id. The case involved prosecutor Vita Marie Mandalla, #105200, of Woodland,
California. My search also revealed another case of public sanctioning of former Madera
County prosecutor George M. Dechant, Jr. #156651, who was summarily disbarred after be-
ing convicted of setting a fire that caused $1 million in damage to his prosecutors' office.
CALIFORNIA BAR JOURNAL, DISCIPLINE: FORMER PROSECUTOR DISBARRED AFTER SEiING
D.A.'s OFFICE ON FIRE (Jan. 1999). available at http://www.calbar.org/2cbj/99jan/pagc25-
I.htm.
158. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 93, at NI. Prosecutor Ray Garza was censured by
the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission for his misconduct in the trial
of Enice Lyles, Jr. for murder. Garza verbally attacked the defense attorney, judges, and wit-
nesses. Garza also cursed at the defendant's lawyer while his co-counsel Prosecutor Scott Ar-
thur threatened the defense counsel to the point where the defense counsel fled the room be-
cause he thought Arthur was going to punch him. The court said Garza and Arthur "destroyed
the aura of dignity" in the courtroom. Though Garza was disciplined, Arthur was investigated
but not disciplined. Id.
159. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial and Error: Prosecution on Trial in
DuPage, Series Three in a Five Part Series, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1999 at NI, available at
wysiwyg://23/http://chicagotribune.com/ne.. ./ws/item/0, 1308,21398-21579-21577,00.html.
160. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Rhode Island Files Disci-
plinary Complaint Against State Attorney General's Office: Statement of Steven Brown, Ex-
ecutive Director ACLU of Rhode Island (August 5, 1998) (on file with author),
http://www.aclu.org/news/n080598d.html. Pace University Law Professor and former Man-
hattan Assistant District Attorney Bennett Greshman, who wrote the book PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT, said "[p]rosecutors have a conviction mind-set ... [and the criminal justice
system is] a mess because prosecutors act unethically and there is no deterrence because there
are no sanctions imposed." Robyn Blumner, Perspective: Prosecutors Should Rethink Their
Goals, ST. PETERSBURG TMES, May 6, 2001, at ID, available at 2001 WL 6976480.
161. Zacharias, supra note 39, 106-07.
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sanctioned, suspended from the practice of law, or barred entirely-they
have little incentive to avoid getting wrapped up in big egos, seeking convic-
tions, and increasing their win-loss records for their own self-interests.
B. Prosecutor Immunity
The Supreme Court in 1976 granted prosecutors immunity from civil
suits, even if they commit misconduct, based on the Supreme Court's belief
that the there were already sufficient means to deal with misconduct-
sanctions by local disciplinary boards and criminal prosecution." Unfortu-
nately, sanctions by local disciplinary boards for prosecutor misconduct are
a very rare occurrence. Furthermore, prosecutors rarely prosecute their own
colleagues for misconduct." Prosecutors know they have full immunity and
wave that flag whenever they can-in the face of claims of prosecutor mis-
conduct.' Although prosecutors have a right to some protection from civil
suits in order to fulfill the functions of their job without dealing with endless
litigation on the side, the prosecutors' interests need to be balanced against
the interests of victims of prosecutor misconduct." When there is no balance
of the defendant's rights to a fair trial and prosecutors know they have full
immunity, there is no deterrent to their conviction seeking, scorekeeping
mentality.
C. Lack of Criminal Convictions Against Prosecutors Engaged in
Misconduct
Prosecutors rarely seek convictions against their colleagues. Out of 381
homicide convictions reversed due to prosecutor misconduct, by failing to
disclose evidence or presenting false evidence to the court, not one prosecu-
tor faced trial for the misconduct." Rather, only two of the cases resulted in
charges being filed that were dismissed before trial." In other cases of
prosecutor misconduct, the Chicago Tribune found only two cases where
prosecutors were actually convicted for their misconduct."s
Prosecutors who do attempt to seek convictions against their fellow
prosecutors face a tremendous uphill battle with jurors who tend not to be-
lieve that the accused prosecutor would do anything wrong."T Prosecutors
162. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 55, at CI. Prosecutors have also been granted
immunity from suits under § 1983. See generally L-wLEss. supra note 30, at 863.
163. See infra. Part V.C.
164. J. Harry Jones, 4 Ex-Gang Members File $10 Million Claims Over Cop-Killing
Case, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 16, 2001, at B2. San Diego District Attorney Paul Pfingst
claimed, "We have full prosecutorial immunity." Id.
165. DWYER, supra note 149, 180.
166. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 159.
167. Id.
168. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 55, at Cl.
169. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 159. Quoting Miami lawyer Gerald Houlihan who
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who face no disciplinary action, no civil consequences, and no criminal con-
sequences for their unethical and unconstitutional practices in the pursuit of
convictions for their tally sheet will continue their misconduct.
D. Sanctioning by Appellate Courts is a "Professional Courtesy"
Appellate courts that overturn convictions because a defendant's rights
were violated due to prosecutorial misconduct, rarely identify the prosecutor
by name and even when they do identify the prosecutor by name, they rule
in unpublished opinions.'7 "The granting of anonymity isn't mandated any-
where, but instead stems from tradition and professional courtesy."' 7'
E. Courts Grant Anonymity to Prosecutors Engaged in Misconduct
Although the Supreme Court in a 1983 opinion suggested that appellate
courts identify prosecutors who have engaged in misconduct as a way to
"chastise" them, what the Court envisioned rarely happens.' For instance,
Carol Pearce McCarthy prosecuted Willie Ray, Jr. in 1982 for murder, but
the conviction was overturned in 1984 by the Illinois Appellate Court.'" The
Court listed several ways in which McCarthy committed misconduct and
said that her actions in the case "read like a veritable hornbook of 'do
nots."" 7 Yet, the court granted her the professional courtesy of referring to
her in their published opinion as "the prosecutor,""' rather than by name.
F. When Courts Identify the Prosecutor By Name, They Issue Unpublished
Opinions
When courts do identify the prosecutor by name, they still grant the
"professional courtesy" of making the opinion unpublished. In one case, the
court named Carol Pearce McCarthy by name for her prosecutorial miscon-
duct but issued an unpublished opinion. 76 Case reporters and legal databases
do not contain unpublished opinions.' In another case, Cook County Prose-
cutor Patrick Quinn had three cases reversed on appeal by the Illinois Appel-
took two prosecutors to trial in 1980 in Rochester, New York, for conspiring with sheriff's
officials to hide evidence and suborn perjury from witnesses who would testify against lead-
ers of organized crime. Prosecutor Raymond Cornelius, who was a judge by then, was acquit-
ted whereas Prosecutor Patrick Brophy was convicted of a misdemeanor and fined $500. Id.
170. See infra Part V.D. 1-2.
171. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 55, at NI.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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late Court for misconduct, but the rulings were all unpublished."" Retired Il-
linois Appellate Court Judge Dom Rizzi "bristles at... ways in which he be-
lieves reviewing courts fail to deter misconduct by prosecutors."'" Judge
Rizzi said that courts document prosecutorial misconduct in unpublished
opinions and treat prosecutorial misconduct as a "harmless error.""W
G. The Supreme Court Sanctions Prosecutor Misconduct as "Harmless
Error"
In Brecht v. Abrahamson, the Supreme Court set forth the "harmless er-
ror" standard in which a defendant is entitled to habeas corpus relief for con-
victions obtained as a result of prosecutorial misconduct, but only if the
defendant can establish that "actual prejudice" resulted.' The prosecutor in
that case made unconstitutional reference to the defendant's post-Miranda
silence as well as constitutional references to the defendant's pre-Miranda
silence." The Court said, considering the record as a whole, the prosecutor's
unconstitutional references to the defendant's post-Miranda silence were in-
frequent, cumulative of his pre-Miranda silence, and evidence of the defen-
dant's guilt was overwhelming.' Thus, the court found that there was no
"actual prejudice.""
The Court's legal analysis of prosecutorial misconduct cases, under the
"harmless error" standard, begins by asking whether the prosecutor's mis-
conduct violated one or more of the defendant's constitutional rights.'u If it
did, the Court may only uphold the conviction against the defendant "if it
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to or result
in the defendant's conviction.' 6 The Court then looks at the strength of the
evidence against the defendant, and if it is overwhelming, then it is likely
that the "error" of prosecutorial misconduct will be deemed "harmless. ' "
The Court also considers the impact of the prosecutorial misconduct on the
jury," whether the misconduct infected the entire trial or just portions
thereof, 9 and whether the prosecutor deliberately committed misconduct.'"
178. Id
179. ld
180. Id
181. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 621 (1993).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. lId
185. LAWLESS, supra note 30, at 946.
186. Id. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,23-24 (1967).
187. LAWLESS, supra note 30, at 945-46. See United States v. Blanton. 730 F.2d 1425,
1434 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Ranney, 719 F.2d 1183. 1190 (1st Cir. 1983); Moore
v. Wyrick, 589 F. Supp. 608, 611 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
188. See United States v. Nickerson, 669 F. 2d 1016, 1019-20 (5th Cir 1982) and United
States v. Chatham, 568 F.2d 445, 451 (5th Cir. 1978).
189. See United States v. Chatham, 568 F.2d 445, 451 (5th Cir. 1978).
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The "harmless error" standard has been called a "lie that the criminal
justice system tells itself."'' The "lie" is used to "absolve police officers and
prosecutors of misconduct."' This lie is a dangerous one-especially to in-
nocent defendants who have been convicted in cases involving prosecutor
misconduct.'93 "Lies, cheating, distortions at the lower levels of the [court]
system are excused at high ones."'94 In sixty-three percent of the convictions
the Cardozo Innocence project studied that were reversed through the use of
DNA evidence to exonerate innocent defendants, prosecutor misconduct
"played an important role in the convictions."19' Young prosecutors pursuing
convictions at all costs soon learn that the court will bail them out by either
ignoring their misconduct altogether or simply calling it a "harmless er-
ror."'
196
The appellate courts appear to condone prosecutor misconduct under
this standard. Thus, "the prosecutor may take liberties, perceiving that the
courts will impose few ethical limitations or not enforce sanctions on his
conduct. Those accused, whether guilty or innocent, suffer the conse-
quences."' 97 If courts do not reverse convictions where there has been mis-
conduct by prosecutors, "there is virtually no way [one] can be assured that
the conduct will not repeat itself in other cases."'98
Prosecutors engrossed in the win-loss record-keeping, conviction seek-
ing mentality forget about their ethical obligations to pursue justice. When
they do, they commit ethical violations and violate defendant's constitutional
rights. For these gross injustices, prosecutors pay little-if anything at all.
Prosecutors receive little discipline from their state bar disciplinary agencies.
They are granted immunity from civil suits, no matter how egregious their
misconduct. Colleagues rarely seek criminal convictions against prosecutors
who have engaged in misconduct. Lastly, the appellate courts and the Su-
preme Court sanction the misconduct. Thus, prosecutors who face no conse-
190. See United States v. Singleterry, 646 F.2d 1014, 1019 (5h Cir. 1981).
191. DWYER, supra note 149, at 175.
192. Id. at 172.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 175. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial and Error: About this Series,
Ci, TRIB., Jan. 8, 1999, available at wysiwyg:/32/http://chicagotribune.comne..nworld/
ws/indx/0,1306,21398-21422.html. The Chicago Tribune studied homicide cases in which
convictions were reversed because prosecutors committed misconduct by failing to disclose
evidence or presenting the court with false evidence. They found a body of cases in which the
courts said the conduct by prosecutors may have been reprehensible, but it probably did not
change the outcome of the trial. This is known as the "harmless error" standard. Armstrong.
supra note 55, at NI. The Chicago Tribune also studied 167 published opinions, involving
prosecutorial misconduct, between 1993 and 1997 in which the Illinois Appellate Court or
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed convictions based on the "harmless error" standard. Id.
195. DWYER, supra note 149, at 175.
196. Dershowitz, supra note 29, at xii.
197. LAWLESS, supra note 30, at 24-25.
198. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 55, at NI.
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quences for their unethical and unconstitutional behavior continue seeking
convictions-by any means.
"[B]y tolerating the erosion of civil liberties of anyone, no matter how
unpopular, we invite prosecutors to violate our civil liberties and the civil
liberties of a family member who may be unlucky enough to fall within the
cross-hairs of a prosecutor's sights."'" There are alternatives to allowing the
erosion of defendants' civil liberties by prosecutors' misconduct engaged in
as a result of seeking convictions in a win-loss record keeping culture.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE To CONVICTION SEEKING, TALLY-KEEPING AS A
MEASURE OF SUCCESS
Clarence Darrow once said, "every kind of human conduct comes from
causes, and in order to change conduct the causes that bring it about must be
altered or removed."' Prosecutor misconduct comes from a cause-win-
loss record-keeping, and conviction seeking mentalities of every prosecu-
tors' office across the nation. The cause must be removed entirely. Prosecu-
tors have an ethical obligation to refrain from seeking convictions and meas-
uring their success in that manner. Prosecutors also have an affirmative
ethical obligation to seek justice.
Former Illinois Supreme Court Judge John L. Nickels said that prosecu-
tors need to be "reoriented" to their duty of justice.' Prosecutors need to see
that winning is not everything and critically question what it even means to
win.' Winning should not be equated with convictions or sentences against
defendants. Winning is more about the process of playing the game. Is the
process fair? Did the prosecutor do what was just and required of him or her
during the process of according the defendant a fair trial? Did the prosecutor
voluntarily disclose evidence and promote the truth from witnesses rather
then perjury? Those are measures of a "winner."
There are a few real "winner" prosecutors in the legal system and few
"loser" prosecutors as well. For example, Brooklyn District Attorney
Charles Hynes agreed that Jeffrey Blake, an innocent man who served eight
years in prison for a murder he did not commit, should be released." Mr.
Hynes discovered evidence that the only witness to the double murder had
perjured himself, thus resulting in the conviction of an innocent man." Mr.
199. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, John Roberts. Executive Director
ACLU of Mass., ACLU Condemns Prosecutorial Abuses on Local and National Level (Feb.
18, 1999) (on file with author), available at http://www.aclu.org/newsl1999/n02l899c.html.
200. DARROW, supra note 106, at 336.
201. Manson, supra note 107.
202. Bresler, supra note 109, at 958.
203. Bob Herbert, Justice Delayed, N.Y. TtmEs, July 30. 1998. at A21; Bob Herbert. A
Case of Lies, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1998, sec. 4, at 15: Bob Herbert, Justice, at Long Last,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1998, at A31; Bob Herbert, Justice Confounded, N.Y TotiS. Dec. 31.
1998, at A19.
204. See supra note 203.
25
Ferguson-Gilbert: It is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It is How You Play the Game: I
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2001
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Hynes supported the release of an innocent man. Mr. Hynes sought justice,
not convictions. °" An example of a "loser" prosecutor, who is actually a real
winner, is Glenn M. Kaas. He was the first prosecutor in Hartford, Connecti-
cut's Community Court."° He said that he "found that the more involved [hel
became with the community restoration business, the farther [he] stray[ed]
from the traditional adversarial system wherein one tallies up one's wins and
losses."2" Mr. Kaas often introduces himself to community groups by saying
that he is possibly one of the worst prosecutors in Connecticut because al-
most ninety-five percent of his cases are eventually dismissed by the
judge."8 When asked whether he is pleased with the statistic, he says, "[yjou
bet."2" Mr. Hynes and Mr. Kaas are both examples of good prosecutors who
seek justice not convictions.
Bruce Green defines "seeking justice" as:
standing up to the police (when their investigations are inadequate), disre-
garding the public (when its expectations are unreasonable), and overcom-
ing one's own self-interest or ennui. In the face of contrary pressures and
expectations, both external and internal, it may take a certain amount of
inner strength (or strength of character) for an individual prosecutor to de-
cide not to bring criminal charges, to comply with procedural norms that
make it more difficult to secure convictions, to confess error, or to seek to
overturn a conviction that was unfairly procured.10
Prosecutors must abandon their win-loss record-keeping, conviction
seeking, mentality and instead seek justice. Instead of asking a prosecutor
what his or her record is to measure the prosecutor's success, one should ask
prosecutors how many times they have concealed evidence to obtain a con-
viction; how many times they have rationalized that evidence did not need to
be turned over to the defense because it was not "material"; how many times
they have suborned perjury to obtain a conviction; how many times they
have presented with false evidence to the court to obtain a conviction; how
many times they knew the defendant was not accorded procedural due proc-
ess and yet did nothing; and lastly and perhaps most importantly-how
many times they have convicted an innocent person or one whom they be-
lieved could be innocent. An answer to these questions of "0 and 0" is a bet-
ter measure--of prosecutor success and the concept of justice-not convic-
tions.
Although substantive justice is difficult to define, as Clarence Darrow
and others have noted, procedural justice is not. The rules clearly define pro-
cedures for prosecutors to follow to insure a fair process for every defen-
205. Herbert, supra note 203, at A21.
206. Glenn M. Kaas, Restorative Justice: A New Paradigm for the 'rosecutor (a View
From Hartford Community Court), 34 PROSECUTOR 31 (2000).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Green, supra note 39, at 642-43.
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dant-whether entirely innocent or factually guilty. Like the Blindfolded
Goddess on the steps of the courthouse, prosecutors may be blind to substan-
tive justice but need only to remove the blindfold to see the clear path to
procedural justice before them. When the blindfold is removed, prosecutors
will see that nowhere along the path are the words "to win" inscribed.
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